



HORN OF AFRICA

MID-YEAR REVIEW



THE "SEVEN HEDGES"

Anticipating Uncertainties by linking Global Occurrences to Local Responses

INTRODUCTION

Globalisation encourages co-existence and an opportunity to live and interact without geographical boundaries, as information sharing is made easy by technology. However, Information sharing and the options resulting from globalisation provide risks to the world.

Globalisation provides uncertainties that can either be good or bad, and policy stakeholders should be involved in a process that includes documenting thematic areas to focus on investment challenges associated with low probability occurrences.

Uncertainties and catastrophe that can otherwise be avoided depending on low probability attribute that governments may be unwilling to pay the costs.(1) A thematic categorisation of global affairs; otherwise referred to as “Hedging” can be used to understand and prepare for the future.(2)

Globalisation has also resulted in states focusing inward depending on the level of impact from external affairs. The outcome has been a regionalisation process that creates supra-institutions to manage their affairs. In the Horn of Africa region, occurrences from the beginning of the year have set a stage for engagement and established priorities on different themes (hedges) that determine progress on activities throughout the year. Though other uncertainties may appear as the year progresses, data shows that the first and second quarters shape the trajectory for the geopolitical affairs.

The occurrences in has April shaped discussions and engagements. April was a dark month showed by the terrorist attack in Siri-Lanka and the removal of Omar Al-Bashir in Sudan. Though these occurrences require individual attention, the underlying issues have a ripple effect on responses and actions taken by states globally and in the Horn of Africa region.

This review pulls out “Seven Hedges” requiring attention in the Horn of Africa by linking global occurrences to responses and actions from the Horn of Africa region.

It analyses issues that seem isolated and merges them to supply the links required for recommendation and practice. The review uses occurrences from the first and second quarters of 2019, to forecast some of the anticipated uncertainties based on the “Hedging” process.

The intention brings out the notion of Collective Conflict Management(3) while staying aware of the stakeholders involved in achieving institutional collaboration(4) as a proposal for a response to uncertainties.(5)

1 Francis Fukuyama, Ed, “Blindside: How to anticipate forcing events and wild cards in global politics,” (Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2007)

2 Richard A. Posner, “Thinking about Catastrophe,” in Francis Fukuyama, Ed, “Blindside: How to anticipate forcing events and wild cards in global politics,” (Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2007)

3 Scott Kirch, and Colin Flint, ed, “Reconstructing Conflict: Integrating war and post-war geographies,”(Ashgate Publishing press, Burlington, 2011)

4 Robert Lempert, “Can Scenarios Help Policymakers Be Both Bold and Careful?”In in Francis Fukuyama, ed, “Blindside: How to anticipate forcing events and wild cards in global politics,” (Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2007)

5 Yolanda Kemp Spies, “Global Diplomacy & International Society,” (Palgrave Macmillan, Switzerland 2019)



An art file belonging to Kevin Kuventhirarasa, nine, a fourth grade student, who was killed during Easter Sunday bombings at Zion Church, Sri Lanka, May 6, 2019. PHOTO | REUTERS

THE RISE AND PLATEAU OF EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES

The attack in Sri-lanka on during the Easter Sunday opened an assortment of problems from globalisation and terrorism. After losing its final piece of territory, ISIS gave notice in Sri Lanka through the Easter bombings of three churches and three popular hotels killing more 300 civilians as claimed by ISIS news agency, Amaq.(6)

In Somalia, intelligence reports revealed a fallout, desertion and defections of foreign fighters within Al-Shabaab following the killing of Kenyan-born commandant Ahmed Iman aka Ayman, in a drone attack in March.(7)

About 50 middle-level militant commanders in lower Shabelle have raised their concerns after chaos, anarchy, suspicion, defections and executions occurred in the camps.(8) However, just like ISIS, the extremist organisation in the Horn

of Africa still pushes on. These two examples are evidence that killing a terrorist group's leaders or diminishing the physical territory is not likely to undermine its ideology.(9)

While activities in Syria point to a demolished ISIS, the presence of returnees coming back to host countries, including the Horn of Africa, pose a danger to countering violent extremism processes. Gangs and cartels have provided a sense of meaning and purpose, mainly to alienated and potentially violent young men through a mix of criminal self-interest and pseudo-religious ideology.(10)

As a hedge that requires concentration, the rise of criminal gangs in the coastal region of Kenya (Mombasa) for example, should serve as a wakeup call to new forms of extremism.(11)The infiltration into gangs by returnees point to a new kind of extremism utilising local level conflict groups for economic gain. Reports from Kenya indicate that around three

6 Robin Wright, "ISIS Still Has Global Reach, Despite the Caliphate's Collapse," *The New Yorker*, April 23, 2019 <https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/isis-still-has-global-reach-despite-the-caliphates-collapse>, accessed May 20th 2019.

7 Nation Correspondent, "Most wanted Shabaab terrorist killed in Somali town air strike," *Nation Online*, March 27th 2019, <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Ahmad-Ali--the-student-who-joined-Al-Shabaab/1056-5043862-bqsiibz/index.html>, accessed July 30th 2019

8 Dominic Wabala, "Al Shabaab in chaos after leader's killing," *The Standard Newspaper*, April 06th 2019, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001319753/al-shabaab-in-chaos-after-leader-s-killing>, accessed May 20th 2019.

9 Bruce Hoffman, "Inside Terrorism," (Columbia University Press, 2006)

10 Stuart Gottlieb, "The terror to come," *The Hill*, April 14th, 2019, <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/438797-the-terror-to-come>, accessed May 20th 2019.

11 Steven Metz, "Jihadism May Be Waning, but New Forms of Violent Extremism Are Emerging," *World Politics Review*, April 12, 2019 <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27754/jihadism-may-be-waning-but-new-forms-of-violent-extremism-are-emerging> accessed May 20th 2019.

returnees were part of a gang terrorising residents in Kwale and Mombasa.(12)

Rehabilitation and disengagement are touted as the way to go while dealing with the challenges of radicalisation and recruitment. Learning the lessons from the camps in Syria with the former ISIS communities, the Kenyan government is establishing a new centre to coordinate operations in the war against terrorism, through support from the United Kingdom. (13)

The ever-growing global connectivity that amplifies anger while linking to the tools of violence threatens to be the new form of violent extremism. Legal and mainstream belief systems or bodies of ideas are producing cancerous offshoots that could feed a new extremist ideology that may not have a religious anchor.(14)

The dislocation brought by climate change could fuel extremism whose violent ideology might target the global elite not for their politics, but solely for their ability to avoid the suffering as a second Hedge. Even with these predictions, global warming and the devastating effects of drought still plague different regions.

12 Mohammed Ahmed, "Revealed: Al-Shabaab returnees join criminal gangs in Coast," Daily Nation, April 29th 2019, <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Al-Shabaab-returnees-behind-Coast-robberies/1064-5092448-4770ic/index.html>, accessed May 20th 2019.

13 Ibad

14 Steven Metz, "Jihadism May Be Waning, but New Forms of Violent Extremism Are Emerging" April 12, 2019, <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27754/jihadism-ay-be-waning-but-new-forms-of-violent-extremism-are-merging>, accessed May 20th 2019.



Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir addresses supporters during his visit to the war-torn Darfur region, in Bilal, Darfur, Sudan September 22, 2017. PHOTO | REUTERS

CHALLENGES TO THE VISION OF INTEGRATION

Globalisation also contributes to the discussions around integration.⁽¹⁵⁾ Several initiatives in the Horn of Africa struggle with pertinent questions on integration and how activities in the global stage affect the decisions made in this regional space in Africa.

There is a call for strengthened cooperation to link prevention, preparedness, response, and address urgent humanitarian needs.

¹⁵ Mehari Taddele Maru, "Is political integration in the Horn of Africa possible? Recent diplomatic initiatives in the Horn are a positive step, but the region needs much more to achieve lasting peace," Aljazeera, April 6th 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/political-integration-horn-africa-190321132102306.html>, accessed May 20th 2019.

Countries in the Horn of Africa formed a task force to coordinate regional interventions in the face of threats to marine resources and security around the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.⁽¹⁶⁾

Though the discussions on integration seem to be providing options for coexistence in the region, other conflicts on resources add to the complexity associated with terrorism. Border disputes between

¹⁶ Fred Oluoch, "Task Force to Co-ordinate Regional Interventions," The EastAfrican, <https://www.theeastfrican.co.ke/news/ea/Horn-of-Africa-task-force-to-co-ordinate-regional-interventions/4552908-5059906-11503uwz/index.html> accessed May 20th 2019.

South Sudan and Sudan over the future of Abyei, and between Eritrea and Ethiopia over the control of towns such as Badme persist. Kenya and Somalia are locked in a dispute over their maritime border in the Indian Ocean. Kenya and Uganda are still competing over the tiny Migingo Island in Lake Victoria. Additionally, States are not immune to the challenges that increasingly challenge their sovereignty.

The Ethiopia-Kenya Cross-border Peace and Development Initiative at the beginning of the second quarter organised a high-level conference in Ethiopia's to explore ways of enhancing peace and security among communities living along the borders of the two countries.⁽¹⁷⁾

The deliberations from this meeting resulted in another engagement in July during the UN conference in Nairobi. These interstate conflicts form the third hedge that requires critical attention in the region.

¹⁷ Mu Xuequan, "Concerted efforts urged to enhance peace, security along Ethio-Kenyan borders," Xinhua, April 17th 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/17/c_137985573.htm, accessed May 20th 2019.



A satellite view of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on March 28, 2015 in Bab el-Mandeb, Yemen. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is located between Yemen and Djibouti, north of Somalia in the Horn of Africa, connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. PHOTO | USGS | NASA | GETTY IMAGES

ECONOMIES, DEMOCRACY AND INTERSTATE DISPUTES

Intrastate conflicts form the fourth hedge that requires focus across the Horn of Africa region. The beginning of the second quarter served as a review of Ethiopia's performance with a new prime minister.(18)

Beneath the latest international narrative of a democratising Ethiopia, articles detail a ruthless struggle among competing for domestic plotlines that include the ruling party; Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), National Movement of Amhara (NaMA), and the

18 Human Rights Watch, "Ethiopia: Abiy's First Year as Prime Minister, Review of Conflict and Internally Displaced Persons" Human Rights Watch, April 9th 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/09/ethiopia-abiy-first-year-prime-minister-review-conflict-and-internally-displaced>, accessed May 20th 2019.

Southern Nation Region with Sidama Community.(19)

Even as the Prime minister transverses the region in search for peace, weaving these internal challenges together using the "MEDEMER" principle(20) will ensure progress towards peaceful and prosperous pluralism.

Internal struggles for Sudan, reiterate the sovereignty challenges faced by the

19 William Davison, "Abiy must weave together multiple plot lines" The Africa Report, April 7, 2019, <https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2019/04/07/abiy-must-weave-together-multiple-plot-lines/>, accessed May 20th 2019.

20 Tibebe Samuel Ferenji, "Acts why Ethiopia does not fit "The Failed State" Status Response to Major Dawit Woldegiorgis: (Part 1)" Borkena, April 24, 2019, <https://borkena.com/2019/04/24/facts-why-ethiopia-does-not-fit-the-failed-state-status-response-to-major-dawit-woldegiorgis-part-1-by-tibebe-samuel-ferenji/>, accessed May 20th 2019

Horn of Africa states even as it unrallied a turning point for the dictatorial activities of Bashir's regime in the second quarter. His removal from power signals new dawn to the nation but more is to be desired, judging from experiences.(21)

The current uprising may not have a connection with a desire for democracy, but a response to the economic crisis that has been shaking the country since the independence of South Sudan and the loss of its oil fields.(22)

Though the Darfur region has seen significant improvements in security, the situation in Sudan currently provides a difficult time for the transition of the Hybrid Operation led by the African Union. (23) The international discussions that push the attention on Sudan also contend with the rising loss of soldiers through attacks in the region.(24) Additionally, South Sudan is also not at ease. Though the pope has called for calm in the country,(25) the rebels warned that the nation could plunge into all-out civil war if the six-month delay to properly prepare a power-sharing government, is not adhered to.(26)

21 AFP, "Sudan: torn apart by war," AFP, Apr 11, 2019, <https://en.prothomalo.com/international/news/193900/Sudan-torn-apart-by-war>, accessed May 20th 2019.

22 Thierry Meyssan, "The Overthrow of Omar el-Bechir," Voltaire, <https://www.voltairenet.org/article206076.html>, accessed 20th May 2019.

23 Political Changes in Sudan Could Affect Mandate of African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, Joint Special Representative Tells Security Council, SC/13783 SECURITY COUNCIL 8513TH MEETING (AM), <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/political-changes-sudan-could-affect-mandate-african-union-united-nations-hybrid>, accessed May 20th 2019.

24 Aljazeera, "Peacekeepers killed in Sudan's Darfur region," Aljazeera, July 14th 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/07/201371319130910958.html> accessed July 30th 2019.

25 Voice of America, "Pope Calls for Peace in Syria, Yemen, Libya, South Sudan," New Delhi Times Bureau April 22, 2019, <https://www.newdelhitimes.com/pope-calls-for-peace-in-syria-yemen-libya-south-sudan/>, accessed May 20th 2019.

26 Francis Okech, "One of Worst African Wars May Revive, South Sudan Rebels Say," Bloomberg, April 24, 2019, <https://news.yahoo.com/one-africa-apos-worst-wars-40000619.html>, accessed May 20th 2019.

MIGRATION, MOVEMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERVENTIONS

While remaining aware of the threats of extremism and terrorism, migration and movement and the refugee crises form the fifth hedge for discussion in 2019. African migration to Europe is qualified by the colonial legacy and post-colonial external meddling. The African Union (AU) leaders, declared 2019 to be “The Year of Refugees, Returnees, and Internally Displaced Persons,” in February.⁽²⁷⁾

Even with a meeting early in the year to celebrate gains, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has only received 13 per cent of the 346.5 million U.S. dollars required to meet the needs of refugees in Ethiopia.⁽²⁸⁾ The challenges associated with migration, movement and refugee crisis, has necessitated the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to expand its Africa Bureau by adding three Regional Offices.⁽²⁹⁾

The creation of bureaus is expected to result in quick response to emergencies. This process will address the migration challenges to find solutions for forcefully displaced persons who have remained the main priority of UNHCR.⁽³⁰⁾

Foreign interference is yet another variable to deepening cooperation and integration. As the sixth hedge, the strategic positioning of the Horn of Africa at the significant geopolitical and geo-economic nexus of the

Red Sea and the Suez Canal, the region is also a battlefield for global forces struggling for the control of large national markets and maritime domains.

Ethiopia is taking up a bold and constructive regional and global role, proper of its geostrategic plans.⁽³¹⁾ Apart from pledging to re-establish the naval force, Abiy is keen on the regional reintegration, which is part of the three pillars of Ethiopia’s Renaissance.⁽³²⁾

Sovereign interests require examination. Examples illustrate how global actors may support or undermine interventions by Horn of Africa states. The toppling of Al-Bashir has brought to light pictorials of eternal actors manipulating the outcomes of the occurrences in the region from the time of the Baggara militias aka “Janjawid” who were supervised by a private US military company, DynCorp International, to prevent oil exploitation by China.⁽³³⁾

The Kenyan foreign ministry, on the other hand, accused the United Nations of bribing Al-Shabaab to ensure humanitarian assistance goes through the different checkpoints in Somalia.⁽³⁴⁾

It is from these allegations that the discussions to dialogue and engage

27 Adekeye Adebajo, “Conflict and migration in Africa,” *Guardian*, April 7th 2019, <https://guardian.ng/opinion/letters/conflict-and-migration-in-africa/>, accessed May 20th 2019

28 Shi Yinglun, “Refugee agency struggles to meet needed funds for refugees in Ethiopia,” *Xinhua*, April 11th 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/11/c_137969254.htm, accessed May 20th 2019.

29 *Eagle Online*, “UNHCR creates more Africa Bureaus for effective response,” *Eagle Online* April 19, 2019 <https://theeagleonline.com.ng/unhcr-creates-more-africa-bureaus-for-effective-response/> accessed May 20th 2019.

30 Ibid

31 Awol Allo, “The Abiy Doctrine: One year of Ethiopia’s new foreign policy,” *African Arguments*, April 5, 2019 <https://africanarguments.org/2019/04/05/the-abiy-doctrine-one-year-of-ethiopia-new-foreign-policy/> accessed May 20th 2019.

32 Awol Allo, “The Abiy Doctrine: One year of Ethiopia’s new foreign policy,” *African Arguments*, April 5, 2019 <https://africanarguments.org/2019/04/05/the-abiy-doctrine-one-year-of-ethiopia-new-foreign-policy/> accessed May 20th 2019.

33 Thierry Meyssan, “The Overthrow of Omar el-Bechir,” *Voltaire*, <https://www.voltairenet.org/article206076.html>, accessed 20th May 2019.

34 Dalsan, “Kenya Accuses UN Of Funding Al-Shabab,” *Dalsan Online*, April 2nd 2019, <https://www.radiodalsan.com/en/2019/04/02/kenya-accuses-un-of-funding-al-shabab/>, accessed May 20th 2019.

MIGRATION, MOVEMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERVENTIONS

terrorists, start pulling weight and questions on the possibility of political settlement and engagement form a centre stage. These issues come against a backdrop of articles pointing to failures from the Somali president⁽³⁵⁾ and his call requesting Al-Shabaab to attack foreign states.⁽³⁶⁾

35 Michael Rubin, "Somalia's president is no ally against terrorism," Washington Examiner, July 26, 2019, <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/somalias-president-is-no-ally-against-terrorism>, accessed July 30th 2019.

36 Unprecedented: President of #Somalia @M_Farmaajo caught on tape encouraging members of terrorist organisation #Al-Shabab to bomb other countries instead of focusing on #Somalia, <https://twitter.com/thebhlub/status/1154420493539258368> accessed July 30th 2019.



THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNET, AI AND BIG DATA TO FOREIGN POLICY

As much as the activities are taking place globally, the ripples affect the greater Horn of Africa directly. The challenges associated with the discussions over the 5-G network paint this picture.(37)

In a report outlining the risks and opportunities, the Chinese telecom

giant's 5G products, particularly its software, has been mentioned to contain significant vulnerabilities.(38) The internet of things and the rise of big data becomes the seventh hedge for the Horn of Africa region.

The US AFRICOM Commander General Thomas Waldhauser complained of interference in the integrity of U.S. military communications systems that rely on 5G networks could be undermined due to existing Chinese communications technology in the Horn.(39)

While sticking to the military impacts of 5G, another discussion affecting responses to the threats in the Horn, including terrorism, revolves around the development and deployment of weapons. As international allies to the Horn prioritise the development of emerging weapon technologies, including sophisticated drones, lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), and swarm technologies, deliberations on the impact of drone activities by the US in Somalia against Al-Shabaab for example, remain a thorn in the flesh of policymakers in the Horn.(40)

37 Guest Blogger, "The Overlooked Military Implications of the 5G Debate Much attention has been paid to the economic and espionage implications of a Chinese lead in developing and operating 5G infrastructure, but the military implications remain largely overlooked, Net Politics, April 25, 2019 <https://www.cfr.org/blog/overlooked-military-implications-5g-debate> , accessed May 20th 2019.

38 Jon Porter, "UK watchdog slams Huawei over 'serious' cybersecurity vulnerabilities," The Verge, March 28th 2019, <https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/28/18285185/huawei-uk-government-cybersecurity-report-5g-rollout-security-concerns> , accessed May 20th 2019.

39 TRANSCRIPT, "Gen. Thomas Waldhauser and Adm. Craig Faller Remarks at Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM," AFRICOM, February 7th 2019, <https://www.africom.mil/media-room/transcript/31504/transcript-gen-thomas-waldhauser-and-adm-craig-faller-remarks-at-senate-armed-services-committee>, accessed May 20th 2019.

40 Abdillahi Sheikh Abukar, "Somalis Harmed by Suspected Drone Strikes Demand Accountability", Just Security, March 27th 2018, <https://www.justsecurity.org/54297/somalis-harmed-suspected-drone-strike-demand-accountability/> accessed May 20th 2019.

As the world's powers venture into this uncharted territory, debates on the legality, utility, and morality of LAWS, are picking up steam. Some experts anticipate that LAWS will help advance international security; while others predict that their development and use will pose destabilising challenges for states.(41)

The social media has benefited the expansion of the business community. However, social media platforms have allowed hate to spread by enabling the distribution of misinformation and the propagation of harmful ideology. The business community has continuously ignored the calls to deal with these emerging issues.

A report developed in the second quarter of 2019 shows how YouTube, allowed extremist content and ignored warnings from employees due to the dread of throttling engage-

ment.(42) Inspired by sermons, lectures and literature online, from many extremists in the last decade of the digital age have been used as radicalisation material through social media.(43)

Social media allows the terrorist to send out propaganda more efficiently, and provide contacting channels for recruits to an organisation.(44) With social media, information consumers also act as communicators, vastly expanding the number of information transmitters in the communication market. This two-way communication promotes the creation of small, diffused sets of communicators and groups.(45)

41 Rahma A. Hussein, Abdifatah Hassan Ali and Alex Moorehead, "Transparency on Civilian Harm in Somalia Matters – Not Just to Americans," Just Security, April 9, 2019, <https://www.justsecurity.org/63554/transparency-on-civilian-harm-in-somalia-matters-not-just-to-americans/> accessed May 20th, 2019.

42 Vallentina Palladion, YouTube ignored extremism in order to boost engagement Bloomberg report shows how employees offered solutions but were turned down, Ars Technica, <https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2019/04/youtube-execs-reportedly-ignored-warnings-of-flourishing-extremist-content/> accessed May 20th 2019.

43 Arjun Singh, "Social Media's Role In Spreading Extremism Can't Be Ignored: Charlie Sennot," Boston Public Radio, April 29, 2019, <https://www.wgbh.org/news/national-news/2019/04/29/sennott-social-medias-role-in-spreading-extremism-cant-be-ignored> accessed May 20th 2019.

44 Gabriel Weimann, "Terrorism in Cyber Space: The Next Generation," (Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2015)

45 Ibid

CONCLUSION

The hedged geopolitical issues affecting the Horn of Africa may have an extreme form of violence as an outcome. Based on the “ six hedges” in the review, the challenges associated with the Collective Conflict Management as insinuated by a myriad of actors and activities from state and non-state, point to a future that is task-oriented, situation determined and spontaneously developing. The spontaneity and the factual resonance of uncertainty in the forms of violent extremism is absolute.⁽⁴⁶⁾ A new type of extremism may not be motivated by Jihadist ideology but by the geopolitical occurrences affecting the Horn of Africa. Concentrating on the factors that draw individuals to any violent inspiring ideology would be the most effective strategy.⁽⁴⁷⁾

A task-oriented process would include a review of some of the low probability hedges that resonate around; individual relationships, communities-built in social spaces, and societal risk factors. Programs in the Horn should contextually determine vulnerable individuals who are at risk of being pulled into religious or any other form of the extremist movement; to resolve the risks before they manifest in criminality; as an efficient, successful and less costly option.⁽⁴⁸⁾ An approach to preventing all forms of violent extremism, practitioners across multiple disciplines should identify and mitigate risk factors to eliminate the arbitrary nature of focusing on one kind of violent extremism or another; by using public-health policies and practices. These approaches can be shared across the Horn of Africa counties with lessons learnt nuanced out, and ready for contextual application.

⁴⁶ Francis Fukuyama, Ed, “Blindside: How to anticipate forcing events and wild cards in global politics,” (Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2007)

⁴⁷ Michael Garcia, “A Public-Health Approach to Countering Violent Extremism” Just Security, April 3rd 2019, <https://www.justsecurity.org/63455/a-public-health-approach-to-countering-violent-extremism/>

⁴⁸ Christianne Boudreau, “How to Measure Countering Violent Extremism Programs,” Clarion Project, April 17, 2019, <https://clarionproject.org/how-to-measure-countering-violent-extremism-programs>, accessed May 20th 2019.

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