TERRORISM TRENDS 2017
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 2018

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Cover Photo: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia: *Assessing the Campaign Against Al Shabaab*. Retrieved 01 01, 2018, from Rand Corporation: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1539.html

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INTRODUCTION

The upsurge in terrorism and Violent extremism in Africa over the decades has created and embellished security threats. The phenomenon has resulted in massive loss of lives and destruction of property; accelerating instability within the countries and regions where organized terrorist groups are operating.[1] Various factors including but not limited to social, political and economic, are intertwined and - ascribed as the sources of the inhuman activities.

The Horn of Africa is marred with conflicts led by both state and non- state armed groups. Different reports attest to the challenges and deaths that have resulted from the various attacks in the region. Law Enforcement and the armed forces are criticized for actions resulting in deaths of innocent civilians. A research document from the Rand Corporation indicates that most of the terrorist organizations that began with violence, 43 percent came to an end through the transition to political engagement, 40 percent through policing, 10 percent because they had achieved their narrow objectives and only 7 percent due to use of force.[2] As a result, increased focus on the use of force is proving futile, and Al-Shabaab decidedly took the war to law enforcement and government institutions in 2017.

As of December 2017, the number of Al-Shabaab fighters has been estimated to be between 7,000-9,000. Though the numbers are dwindling with the neutralization of over 400 militants in 2017, other sources cite that the group is regrouping. It also comes after the intervention of various well-coordinated efforts on countering their effects between and among the states in the region and continent at large. States in the Horn have joined efforts in fighting the insurgent group in a somewhat efficient way.

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[1] Ramdeen, M. (2017, 07 21). Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa. Retrieved 12 03, 2017, from Arfican center for the constructive resolution of Disputes ACCORD: http://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/countering-terrorism-violent-extremism-africa/

[2] Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki., How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida, MG-741-RC, 2008,252 pp., available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG741/.

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To date, casualties associated with the extremist organization sore at around 1,818 individuals from across the region; with Kenya and Somalia leading in contribution to these numbers. Documented injuries average 881 Individuals; some of whom have later died as a result of their injuries. Apart from the ethnically motivated forms of violence, violent extremist attacks led by Al-Shabaab activities top the list of casualties.

Climate change and migration have not made it easy for conflict management in the region. After a long drought season, the area has witnessed movement across borders. Climate change has also seen the participation of both the usual and unusual actors in humanitarian development as reported by different media in Southern Somalia.[3] Al-Shabaab, reportedly provided aid to some communities in the region while denying access to other aid actors in other

[3] Scofield Associates. (2017, 08 21). Scofield Associates Limited. Retrieved from POLITICAL DYNAMICS TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA; ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND REFUGEE CRISIS: http://www.scofieldassociates.co.ke/political-dynamics-to-conflict-management-2.php

areas; within Somalia.[4] Terrorist and Extremist organizations are not a monolithic, static entity but an ever-changing entity whose goals and objectives keep on shifting.[5] Even though not related to the HoA, illegal migration and movement, slave trade and the activities in Libya have helped shape the AU discussions in the region. Data sources from the HDX[6] provide information of the impact of drought in the region and indications on the amount of investment in the region.

Politics has not left the center stage when dealing with Violent Extremism. As a country coming from electioneering period, Kenya has witnessed challenges ranging from lack of participation in elections, migration, and movement from Lamu for fear of attacks,[7] praises, and blame in equal measure on Al-Shabaab activity,[8] and challenges of transmission of results due to the destruction of communication masts,[9] in Northern Kenya. Even though Tanzania is keen not to talk loudly about extremism, Violent Extremism (VE) seems to be finding a new home for its activities. The incidents in Kibiti can be highlighted to illustrate this argument.[10] Also, Amboni caves have now come to light after incidents that happened in 2016 and the perception the community had.

Politics has been an underlying issue in Somalia, based on Al-Shabaab's targeted assassinations.[11] This year, politicians have been a target for the extremist organization; with Mogadishu facing the wrath of the attacks. AMISOM is not left behind. Even though reports indicate that armed forces have also contributed to various civilian deaths in Somalia,[12] they law enforcement teams have also been a major target for Al-Shabaab in 2017. The UN has just released a report that covers a period from January 2016 to October 2017, indicating massive civilian casualties in Somalia; with some of

[4] ibid
[5] William Donohue and Moty Cristal Growing Out in Organization Pg. 57 – 78 in Engaging Extremists; Trade Offs, Timings and Diplomacy, William Zartman, Guy Oliver Faure, 2011, USIP Press Washington DC.
[6] HDX. (2017, 11 22). Somalia Data Sets. Retrieved 01 01, 2018, from Humanitarian Data Exchange: https://data.humdata.org/search?q=Somalia&ext_search_source=main-nav&page=2
[7] Gari, A. (2017, 06 25). Ignore al Shabaab threats, only meant to scare Lamu West voters - MP Ndegwa. Retrieved 01 01, 2018, from The Star Newspaer Online: https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/06/25/ignore-al-shabaab-threats-only-meant-to-scare-lamu-west-voters-mp_c1585820
Scofield Associates Limited. (2017, 09 25). Scofield Associates. Retrieved from KENYA CEASE FIRE MOMENT: http://www.scofieldassociates.co.ke/kenya-cease-fire-moment.php

[8] ibid
[9] Scofield Associates Limited. (2017, 09 25). Scofield Associates. Retrieved from KENYA CEASE FIRE MOMENT: http://www.scofieldassociates.co.ke/kenya-cease-fire-moment.php
[10] (The National Newspaper Daily News, 2017)
[11] KABENDERA, E. (2016, february 21). Tanzania on security alert after police attacked. Retrieved from The East African: http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Tanzania-on-security-alert-after-police-attacked/2558-2630984-93w78ez/index.htm
[12] Human Rights Watch. (2017). Somalia Events of 2016. Retrieved from Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/somalia

the numbers not only attributed to extremist groups but also Law Enforcement.[13]

The ongoing unrests that have engulfed East and Horn of Africa have recorded the highest number of deaths being 45 Al-Shabaab militia and 43 AMISOM soldiers. However, the month of October saw the most significant casualties associated with Al-Shabaab in Somalia totaling to an average of 512 fatalities. Some of the tactics include; Ambush of convoy vehicles, Landmine explosives, Roadside bombs, a direct attack on police stations and hijacking, use of explosives, abductions of civilians and suicide bombers. A country by country analysis indicates that the different incidents have focused on Somalia as the highest target and Tanzania as the lowest target in the region and with no reported incidents in Ethiopia.

METHODOLOGY

Scofield Associates team has been reviewing conflict incidents in the greater Eastern Africa since the beginning of 2017. Data collection was done through online analysis of reports, data feedback from the field in Kenya, Tanzania and Somalia, and a review of media articles that report on incidents as they occur. The methodology of data collection also utilized big data from Google and correlations to other databases reviewing conflict and incidents in the region.

For analysis, data was correlated using machine learning algorithm software; to understand the impact of terrorism in the Horn of Africa, and possibly provide some trends and recommendations for 2018.

Limitations and Mitigation

The data collection process was conscious of the context and constraints available both in the field and in the process of investigation. However, below are specific limitations for, and how the analysis helped deal with the issues:

- *Verification of Numbers:* Most of the data collected was dependant on feedback from our research teams in the community and verification of data sources from google and media sources online. As a result, there are differences in the exact numbers of the casualties. As a mitigation strategy, the team mentions that the final tallies are an average figure and not an absolute number.

Number of Deaths Vs. Survivors: Most of the reporting focuses on those who died

[13] Ozonnia, O., Yahya, M., Banfield, J., Kipgen, C., Botha, A., Elman, I., . . . He. (2017). Journey to Extremism in Africa. New York: UNDP.

during the incident. The challenge comes about when trying to verify those individuals who succumbed to their injuries after the incident; either in Hospital or at a later date. How then do we account for these numbers? For this analysis, we take note of the injured individuals and assume that other deaths after may not align with the terrorist activity.

The data findings presented in this report covers three countries including; Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia. Even though there was anecdotal mention of radicalization and recruitment and the possibility of deaths associated with extremist groups in Uganda, Sudan, and South Sudan, there is no clear indication that Al-Shabaab (most active extremist group), has presence or attacks in the countries mentioned. The information below, therefore, provides a pictorial of 2017.

SOMALIA

Most of the attacks have targeted Mogadishu in Somalia. In 2017, Somalia recorded the highest number of casualties in the entire region. October had the highest number of fatalities with an average 512 individuals in one attack. A total of 123 incidents relating

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to extremist activities reported within Somalia. This year has also seen ISIS take responsibility for at least four attacks in Somalia leading to an average of 19 fatalities. Also, the US lost a soldier during a shoot-out with Al-Shabaab Militants. However, with over 33 airstrikes by Africom[14], a total of 472 militants representing Al-Shabaab and ISIS, have been neutralized. The pattern of the strikes indicates that most of the militant's plan or conduct most of their activities in the Lower Shabelle region and Bosaso area. Mogadishu is a transit route of a target to attract attention.

Millitant Casualties

Map based on average of LONGITUDE and average of LATITUDE. The marks are labeled by sum of MILITANTS. Details are shown for AREA.

Migration and famine is a contributing factor to the conflict in the region. Al-Shabaab, on the other hand, has taken the opportunity to assist some communities through the

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[14] Somalia Reported US Action (2017), Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Retrieved, 01 01, 2017, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/somalia-reported-us-covert-actions-2017

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provision of humanitarian aid and blocked support in other instances.[15] Though reporting on incidents has advanced, the nuances of gender, militant or not, and government or civilian, have not been consistent. Also, survivors of the different incidents are forgotten as soon as the incidents occur, and the accumulation of numbers is not consistent. In addition, there are clan-based attacks that have taken place in Somalia, reported as Al-Shabaab related as they either happen in their controlled regions or have some similarities.

Summary 2

The trends of sum of CIVILIANS, sum of INJURIES, sum of LAW ENFORCEMENT, sum of MILITANTS and sum of TOTAL FATALITIES for DATE/MONTH (Months).

Finally, ISIS seems to be establishing a foothold in Somalia. With two different attacks in Bosaso, (8th February and 23 May) and three in Qandala (28th March 1st February and 29h January) and Airstrikes with US support targeting the same areas, creates a worrying trend for C/PVE activities in the region. Data indicates that until October, most of the attacks focused on Mogadishu and targeted government

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[15] Moses Rono, 22 March 2017, BBC Monitoring: Somalia food crisis: Has al-Shabaab adopted new approach to food aid?

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39296517 date accessed 17th August 2017

machinery, law enforcement, and AMISOM soldiers in Somalia. The top-level analysis may argue that Al-Shabaab was also looking to replenish the arms lost in previous engagements with Amisom.

ISIS FATALITIES .

KENYA

For a long time, widespread narratives seemed to suggest that violent extremism had foreign origins and inherently a non-Kenyan problem. One of Al-Shabaab's leaders is from Kenya,[16] whereas other Kenyan nationals are recruited into the organization, and extremist attacks continue to take place throughout the country[17] In addition, data suggest that a local extremist arm of Al-Shabaab is domiciled in Lamu area.[18] Most of the attacks have targeted Lamu and Garissa. In 2017, the country has

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[16] Guha, S. (2017). Violent Extremism in Kenya ' Risk and Resilience. Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved from Rift Valley Institute: http://riftvalley.net/publication/violent-extremism-kenya#.WjOxH9-WZPY

[17] ibid

[18] Scofield Associates. (2017, 08 17). *Scofield Associates.* (T. Ngao, Ed.) Retrieved from Security Review (4th August 2017-

15th August 2017):
http://www.scofieldassociates.co.ke/Security-Review-4th-August-2017-15th-August-2017.php

had nine attacks in May 2017 recording the highest targeted deaths by Al-Shabaab. A total of 36 incidents, 100 fatalities and 56 injuries reported as a result of attacks from Al-Shabaab. Land issues in Lamu are a contributing factor to the conflict in the region. Al-Shabaab, on the other hand, has taken advantage of the vulnerability of the community within the area to recruit more members through coercion as a means of solving these issues. In addition, a local cell has also set up camp around Boni forest area in Lamu, and they have been responsible for most of the attacks in the region this year.[19]

Summary Graph

Al-Shabaab is conducting these killing to eliminate their enemies, intimidate the population, discourage cooperation while influencing the public opinion into joining them thus driving the agenda that the government is ineffective in protecting its

[19] Scofield Associates. (2017, 08 21). Scofield Associates Limited. Retrieved from POLITICAL DYNAMICS TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA; ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND REFUGEE CRISIS: http://www.scofieldassociates.co.ke/political-dynamics-to-conflict-management-2.php

citizens. It creates a worrying trend for C/PVE activities in the area due to the changing attack strategy by targeting Law Enforcement officers. Al-Shabaab has resorted to killings that target government officials, with the attack on the cabinet secretary[20], in Lamu causing a stir in the media. In another attack targeting law enforcement, two Administrative police officers were killed on 28th November 2017 is evidence of targeting from the extremist organization.[21] The targeting of law enforcement including five police officers in Garissa[22] triggered social media discussions that were either supporting or against their actions.[23] This attack had social media celebrations as it managed to lure emotions from the members of the community who were reeling from police brutality after the general elections.

TANZANIA

There is evidence to show that Violent extremism and terrorism may be on the rise in the country. Even though Tanzania has not faced retaliatory or targeted attacks as

mentioned in the other country findings, various activities point to the presence of extremist organizations in the region. The Amboni, caves incidents in Tanga and the attacks of eight officers (2017) by unknown extremist assailants, provide early warning signs for the area. Even though the state does not categorize those incidents as violent extremism or terrorism, threats that have an association to political undertones in Zanzibar, resource allocation in Morogoro and the economic needs in Tanga, may provide more push towards radicalization and recruitment. The top-level analysis indicates that Tanzania could be seen as a harbor for recruitment and planning of activities in the Horn and larger East Africa. It has not also faced the wrath of the extremist group because;

1. The state has not contributed troops to Amisom
2. The state seems not to be "pro-western" in its ideologies, and
3. The presence of a larger population of the Muslim Umma.

[20] Scofield Associates. (2017, 08 21). Scofield Associates Limited. Retrieved from POLITICAL DYNAMICS TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA; ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND REFUGEE CRISIS: http://www.scofieldassociates.co.ke/political-dynamics-to-conflict-management-2.php

[21] Mohammed Ahmed, K. K. (2017, 11 28). The Daily Nation. Retrieved from Two APs killed in attack by suspected Shabaab militants: http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/lamu/APs-die-Shabaab-attack-Lamu/3444912-4206804-1qqctiz/index.html

[22] Astariko, S. (2017, 08 14). The Star. Retrieved 12 13, 2017, from Five cops killed in Garissa after Alshabaab Attack Police Post: https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/08/15/five-cops-killed-in-garissa-after-al-shabaab-attack-police-post_c1617433

[23] Scofield Associates. (2017, 08 17). Scofield Associates. (T. Ngao, Ed.) Retrieved from Security Review (4th August 2017-15th August 2017): http://www.scofieldassociates.co.ke/Security-Review-4th-August-2017-15th-August-2017.php

CORRELATION AND DATA LINKING

Terrorism is a tool used by the few to scare many. It is the case on the data for previous years. According to the Global Terrorism index, the bigger target has been to the citizens or civilians, with the aim of pushing the state to act or respond in a given way. In 2017 alone data indicates a more significant target to the law enforcement and the civilians coming in as collateral damage to the target. Apart from the attack in Somalia that claimed over 300 people in one incident, the rest have had a significant focus on government institutions in the region.

Amisom and the various governments in the region led by Kenya and Somalia have indicated progress in dealing with the extremist organization; Al-Shabaab. However, the extremist organization seems to be growing and regrouping. The recent purge, and fall out between the top commanders of the organization is not slowing down the activities of the organization.[24] As indicated in the

introduction, politics play an essential component for the continued support and activities for the extremist organization. An article by Abdul Khalif & Cedric Barnes [25] in February 2016 cautioned against the lack of political agreement within Amisom and the various interest groups in the region, playing into the hands of the extremist organization. It is also compounded by the allegations that the Amisom group were responsible for some increased civilian casualties in Somalia; [26] a factor that is aiding in radicalization and recruitment.

The targeting of Law Enforcement and Government machinery may also be as a result of reduced stockpiles that Al-Shabaab once had. On this front, Amisom and different security operations in the region may have borne fruit. The groups' counter-attack now taints the successes as they restock. With this in mind, 2017 attacks can be categorized as arms race for the extremist organization. The patrol of Kismayo port by Amisom and capture of the various business interest areas, Al-Shabaab is starved of arms.[27] It has also seen them retreat to the

[24] Wabala, D. (2017, 11 26). Fallout in Al Shabaab camp as commanders defy top leader. Retrieved 01 01, 2018, from Standard Digital: https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001261279/fallout-in-al-shabaab-camp-as-commanders-defy-top-leader

[25] (Khalif, A., & Barnes, C. (2016, 02 11). Somalia: Why is Al-Shabaab Still A Potent Threat? Retrieved 01 01, 2018, from International Crisis Group: http://blog.crisisgroup.org/africa/somalia/2016/02/11/somalia-why-is-al-shabaab-still-a-potent-threat/

[26] Independent Advisory Group on Country Information. (2017). Country Policy and Information Note Somalia (South and Central): Security and humanitarian situation. Independent Advisory Group on Country Information. London: Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration.

[27] Kelly, K. J. (2017, 11 13). KDF on the Spot over Al-Shabaab Charcoal Export. Retrieved 01 01, 2018, from Nation Media Newspaper: http://www.nation.co.ke/news/KDF-Al-Shabaab-charcoal-trade-in-Somalia-UN-report/1056-4184482-iuv6cg/index.html

southern parts Somalia where they seem to be buying goodwill from the community through the provision of services including humanitarian support.[28] As data sources indicate; including the most recent attack on a police post in Ijara (where they took off with a police car),[29] Al-Shabaab stockpiling in preparation for new attacks in 2018.

Most of the attacks in 2017 focused on; Mogadishu in Somalia and the peripheral towns in Kenya including; Lamu, Garissa, Isiolo, and Wajir. The centrality of Somalia and the set-up of government in the region makes it a target for Al-Shabaab, who seek to destabilize the young government in the region.

Map based on average of LONGITUDE and average of LATITUDE. Color shows sum 1707 as Total Fatalities.

In addition, many Amisom activities are not concentrated in the area. Instead, the local police have taken control of the capital.

Questions abound on the capacity of the local law enforcement to deal with the challenge of Al-Shabaab in Somalia[30] The

[28] Moses Rono, 22 March 2017, BBC Monitoring: Somalia food crisis: Has al-Shabaab adopted new approach to food aid? http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39296517 date accessed 17th August 2017
[29] (Oride, 2017)

[30] Jones, S. G., Liepman, A., & Chandler, N. (2016). Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia; Assessing the Campaign Against Al Shabaab. Rand Corporation. Santa Monica, Calif: Rand.

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takeover of Rasadaay, a strategic town that Al-Shabaab took over without a fight after the departure of Amisom on October 31, 2017, adds to the complication of having Amniyaat set up in different communities in the area.

Even though various international and regional conflict management organizations have set up base in Mogadishu, the question of winning the hearts and minds, seem not to be bearing fruit as at yet.

Kenya's peripheral attacks may be attributed to law enforcement focusing on keeping the enemy out and not looking inward. A report by the crisis group previously mentioned that Al-Shabaab had set up camp in Kenya, recruiting from within and planning activities in-country [31]. These allegations are supported by the local cell that has been causing havoc in Lamu in 2017. In our analysis, we argue that Al-Shabaab's movement may have been curtailed by the increased surveillance from the periphery inward; an excellent job by law enforcement. However, the ease of movement between the peripheral towns where they conduct attacks and back into Somalia, where they have been pushed by Amisom, makes these areas an easy target[32]

It is not to say that they are not moving inward. Al-Shabaab being an organization that continuously evolves makes tracking more difficult but a feasible endeavor. Exploration of new "areas" would be an avenue to exploit. A report by BRICS program indicated that some of the not so targeted ports of Isebania and Busia border in Migori and Busia, respectively should be looked into as new areas for radicalization, recruitment and movement.

The death of a Sudanese Al-Shabaab extremist[33] in one of the airstrikes in Somalia complicates the narrative on ease of movement across peripheral towns and the question of radicalization and recruitment.

[31] International Crisis Group. (2014, 09 25). Kenya: Al-Shabaab – Closer to Home. (Briefing, Producer) Retrieved 01 01, 2018, from International Crisis Group: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenya-al-shabaab-closer-home

[32] Cannon, B. J. (2017, 11 15). Why Al-Shabaab targets Kenya – and what the country can do about it. Retrieved 01 01, 2018, from The Conversation: http://theconversation.com/why-al-shabaab-targets-kenya-and-what-the-country-can-do-about-it-87371

[33] US Africa Command (2017,11,03), U.S. conducts airstrikes against ISIS in Somalia, Retrieved 01 01,2018, http://www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/30046/u-s-conducts-airstrikes-against-isis-in-somalia

Map based on average of LONGITUDE and average of LATITUDE. Color shows sum of Total Fatalities. The marks are labeled by sum of Total Fatalities. Details are shown for AREA. The view is filtered on AREA, which excludes Milihoi.

Geopolitics also plays a vital role in radicalization, recruitment, movement, and attacks in the region. Zanzibar and Tanga have come into the limelight as far as extremist activities are concerned.

For a long time, Tanga coastal region has witnessed a lot of illegal trade and movement. Its border to coastal Kenya and coastal share with Somalia and other Eastern countries may also put it at risk. Also, though politically motivated, the tensions in Zanzibar over leadership and the complexities of identity that span religious

and political descriptive, makes the region at risk in 2018. It is further compounded by its open ocean front and uninhabited islands that are under the Republic of Tanzania.

In June 2017, an international report indicated that Ethiopian forces killed 14 civilians in Somalia as they pursued Al-Shabaab.[34] In addition, their participation in Amisom has not warranted retaliatory attacks in Somalia. Would this be as a result of border security or the ease in

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[34] Independent Advisory Group on Country Information. (2017). Country Policy and Information Note Somalia (South and Central): Security and humanitarian situation.

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information. London: Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration.

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communication between law enforcement and the community?

Analysis indicates that Ethiopia is one of the countries that has started implementing some of the recommendations to ensure refugees are incorporated into the system, in the region.[35] Having one of the largest refugee teams from Somalia, Ethiopia has managed to provide support to the refugee community. Ethiopia purged, rebel groups internally but there was evidence of an attack targeting Addis in 2014.[36] With the continued drought situation in Somalia and the movement of people into the country, 2018 will be seen as a test of Ethiopia's capacity to accommodate while at the same time keeping the "bad" elements out of its borders.

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[35] Jeffrey, J. (2017, 05 17). As Western nations shut out migrants, Ethiopia's doors are open — even to its enemy. Retrieved 01 01, 2018, from PRI: https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-05-17/west-shuts-out-migrants-ethiopias-doors-are-open-even-its-enemy

[36] Maasho, A. (2014, 10 15). U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia warns of attacks by Somali militants. Retrieved 01 01, 2018, from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-somalia-attacks/u-s-embassy-in-ethiopia-warns-of-attacks-by-somali-militants-idUSKCN0I41G420141015

2018 RECOMMENDATIONS

Looking forward, this trend review for 2017 provides us with a plot for activities and areas that require concentration in 2018. Most of the recommendations are from policy documents on programming, implementation, and trends of the data provided.

1. Applying conflict management strategies with a P/CVE lenses would be instrumental in dealing with violent extremism in the community in 2018. Focusing on P/CVE related activities that may have gains on the subject matter may be successful than branding activities as P/CVE. It will also alleviate the risk of profiling and increase buy-in from the community.

2. Identification of the at-risk communities is more challenging in P/CVE projects and programming. In most cases, the "at-risk" population is not clear, and programs gamble with profiling certain categories in the community to justify engagement with them.[37] It is not sustainable for 2018 moving forward. The push to look at community resilience in different areas of program implementations is essential but may not be enough to quantify

expenditures in the project. Also, projects in 2018 should also focus on the cross-border areas and a specific interest in Migration and Movement.

3. The challenge of direct relationships between Value for Money vs. the timeline for implementation, questions how; "Little Evidence" (amounts) can be quantified as a success.[38] Increased focus on pilot programs and the process will provide more data and information in the communities and have more success than the continuous routine program implementation cycles.

4. Terminology issues have been a challenge both at the policy level and even at program implementation level. With this confront in mind, 2018 projects should try and avoid utilization of jargons in the project development[39] and implementation. However, having a primary guiding process that provides boundaries

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[37] Global Counter Terrorism Forum. (2013). Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism. Ankara: GCTF.

[38] Ris, L., & Ernstorfer, A. (2017). Borrowing a Wheel: Applying Existing Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Strategies to Emerging Programming Approaches to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism. New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York.

[39] Global Counter Terrorism Forum. (2013). Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism. Ankara: GCTF.

including geographical reach, for the project and its implementation, would suffice in project development. This recommendation also applies to understanding the local context where the project is to be implemented. A better understanding of the conflict dynamics and the fundamental local definitions assist in the development of models that work well as indicated in the US Joint strategy document.[40] 2018 should also focus on horning down on the development of standard terminology to assist in project development and implementation. A research process that focuses on getting local terminology to be used across the board; would be instrumental in harmonizing activities while also providing a better understanding of the subject matter.

5. Different states in the region and international organizations have developed documentation and guiding policy for P/CVE. These have different names but serve the same purpose of providing a harmonized process of thematic grouping, activities implementation, and coordination. Targeting the project activities and aligning to different National and international policy guidelines provide an avenue of success and ease the process of coordination. The National Counter Terrorism Strategy[41] in Kenya, The IGAD strategy[42] and the UN Plan of Action[43], provides different thematic areas for activities. In 2018, this alignment process should be strengthened as it ensures that funding for activities is well shared within the vast area of need in the community and duplication of roles is minimized.

6. A precise grouping of whether the project is P/CVE specific or P/CVE related, assists in the development of linkages for evaluation and program implementation.[44] As part of the ownership process, working with the community to develop an assessment matrix is crucial to the success of the project. With the complexities

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[40] US Department of State. (2016). Department of State & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism. Washington DC: US State Department.
[41] NCTC Kenya. (2016). National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism. Nairobi: NCTC Kenya.
[42] IGAD. (2017). Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism. Addis Ababa: IGAD Secretariat.

[43] UN Secretary General. (2016). Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. Newyork: United Nations.
[44] Farsight. (2016). Designing Countering Violent Extremism Programs: A Strategic Overview. Nairobi: Farsight.

associated with program implementation, the utilization of Participatory Systemic Inquiry[45] is essential to ascertain most if not all of the assumptions that may be encountered during program implementation. Putting the assumptions into perspective during program development is as critical as knowledge and understanding of how international actions affect projects implemented locally.[46] Different events and activities provide stimuli to project activities and programs need to either plan for them by an assumption analysis process, or by being flexible to shift to address the challenges.[47]

7. Community resilience is essential in program development and implementation. As a recommendation, inventing the wheel has not been wholly successful. A study by USIP on Community Resilience to Violent Extremism highlights the need to have local solutions to local problems.[48] In fact, a project implemented at local and national level needs to amplify "What Works" in the different communities.[49] However, this should be done with conflict sensitivities to the needs of the community. With that in mind, projects need to be careful about overall branding, activity branding and even donor branding (in some instances) to ensure that the project does not harm.[50]

8. At the implementation level, communication procedures with the community are also essential.[51] For programs implementing alternative narratives, or any other community projects dealing with P/CVE, having one point of contact for communication on activities with the community helps to build trust. Communication models should also have a bottom-up approach and a

[45] **i**bid
[46] Burns, D., & Worsley, S. (2015). Navigating Complexity in International Development: Facilitating Sustainable change at Scale. Warwickshire, UK: Practical Action Publishing.
[47] IGAD. (2017). *Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism.* Addis Abbaba: IGAD Secretariat.
[48] GCTF. (2012). Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as a Tool to Counter Violent Extremism. Antalya: GCTF.
[49] Global Counter Terrorism Forum. (2013). Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism. Ankara: GCTF., Metre, L. V., Muliru, S. Y., Chome, N., Kisia, A., Claes, J., Heeg, J., & Carpenter, A. (2016). Community Resilience to Violent

Extremism in Kenya. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.
[50] Holmer, G. (2016). *Countering Violent Extremism: A peacebuilding Perspective.* Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace., Organization for Security and Co-operation In Europe. (2014). Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that leads to Terrorism: A community-Policing Approach. Vienna: OSCE., Ginkel, D. v. (2017). Violent Extremism and Development: Witnessing a Fundamental Pivot. Netherlands : Netherlands Institute of International Relations .
[51] Farsight. (2016). Designing Countering Violent Extremism Programs: A Strategic Overview. Nairobi: Farsight.

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top-down feedback mechanism in 2018. Continuous flow information and encouragement of feedback loops both from governments, international organizations and implementing partners; to the communities is vital in P/CVE.

9. Various legislations, the AU adopted the African Model Law on Countering Terrorism. Chapter one part 9 indicates that any association with terrorism whether for peaceful engagement or otherwise is considered an offense and will depend on the penalty specified under part 5 of the same model law.[52] In 2011, Somali Prime Minister, Abdiwali Ali, in an interview with BBC stated that the government was willing to have negotiations with Al-Shabaab.[53] Even with the said disadvantages, various findings

conclude that government have now come to realize that groups engaging in violent attacks against innocent civilians may not be stopped any other way.[54] That said, the engagement with the terrorist organizations including should be based on the question of forgiving and forgetting the past but holding a pragmatic position for the future[55] In an article providing recommendations and options of engaging Non-State-Armed-Groups, including Terrorists in this case; Al-Shabaab suggests a strategy to start the conversation.[56] In 2018, we should consider this engagement as other factors including the need of top commanders' need to leave the outfit[57]; providing an opportunity to start the conversation.

[52] The African Model Anti-Terrorism Law Final Draft as Endorsed by the 17th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union Malabo, 30 June – 1 July 2011
[53] TFG expresses willingness to negotiate with Shabaab – Hiiraan Online, 09 September 2011
http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2011/Sept/20307/tfg_expresses_willingness_to_negotiate_with_shabaab.aspx date accessed 26th June 2016
[54] Audrey Kurth Cronin, When Should We Talk to Terrorists, USIP Special Report 240 May 2010,
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR240Cronin.pdf
[55] Aba Eban Israeli Ex foreign minister19 Statement to the Security Council, 6 June 1967,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook1/pages/19%20statement%20to%20the%20security%20council%20by%20foreign%20mi.aspx date accessed 22 June 2016
[56] Muliru, S. (2016). Engagement with Extremist Organizations; Putting Al-Shabaab into context. Policy Brief, Scofield Associates, Nairobi.

[57] (APOLLO, S. (2017, 09 06). WHY KENYAN AL-SHABAAB LEADER WANTS TO DEFECT FROM TERROR GROUP. Retrieved 01 01, 2018, from Nairobi News: http://nairobinews.nation.co.ke/news/al-shabaab-leader-defect-terror-group/, Garowe Online. (2017, 06 24). US Drops Reward for Somali Terror Leader. Retrieved 01 01, 2018, from Garowe Online: https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/us-drops-terror-reward-for-somali-al-shabab-leader, Goldberg. (2017, 11 20). Kenyan-Born Al Shabaab Video And Online Propagandist To Leave Terror Group As Rift In Al Shabaab Widens. Retrieved 01 01, 2018, from Strategic Intelligence Service: http://intelligencebriefs.com/kenyan-born-al-shabaab-video-and-online-propagandist-to-leave-terror-group-as-rift-in-al-shabaab-widens/

10. Finally, research is a continuous process, and though there are arguments to suggest that sometimes too much research is done at the expense of project implementation, the process should be encouraged and continuous. The recommendations listed in research work should be targeted and actionable. The Journey to Extremism provides such actionable recommendations including; identification of the grievance before program design, analysis of tipping points and stressing on the need to have P/CVE related projects that bare dividend.[58] Also, the focus should be given on expanding the impact of VE activities to other sectors of the economy in the region. These should be used as reference points for program development, funding, and implementation.

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[58] Ozonnia, O., Yahya, M., Banfield, J., Kipgen, C., Botha, A., Elman, I., . . . He. (2017). *Journey to Extremism In Africa.* Newyork: UNDP.

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