A Horn of Africa Crisis Will Not Stop at the Border: Why Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions, Somalia’s political divisions and AUSSOM’s funding uncertainty require one regional response

Articles

November 09, 2026

Horn of Africa Risk Strategy Briefing - Scofield Associates

The Horn of Africa’s security crises are often discussed separately. Ethiopia’s search for dependable maritime access is treated as an economic question, renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia as an internal conflict with potential Eritrean involvement, and Somalia’s struggle against Al-Shabaab as a separate counter-terrorism challenge. This separation is strategically misleading. Decisions in one theatre affect another when states, military assets and political relationships overlap.

Conflict in northern Ethiopia will not automatically produce an Al-Shabaab advance in Somalia. The risk is that regional escalation, poorly managed troop changes, weak logistics and unresolved Somali political disputes combine to create openings for the group. Prevention requires verified information, predictable support and respect for Somali institutions.

The 4 October 2026 El Alamein Joint Declaration brought Egypt, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan together around sovereignty, Red Sea navigation, Nile cooperation and support for Somalia’s counter-terrorism effort. It called for adequate, sustainable and predictable financing for the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The declaration is an important diplomatic statement, but its text does not establish a collective defence treaty or a binding military alliance against Ethiopia. Treating consultation as a military bloc risks hardening threat perceptions before diplomatic channels are exhausted.

Ethiopia’s concern about dependable maritime access deserves serious consideration. As a landlocked state reliant on neighbouring ports for trade, Ethiopia has legitimate interests in affordable, secure and predictable commercial access. Those interests do not confer a right to another state’s territory or justify the threat or use of force. Eritrea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are equally clear principles. The practical route forward is to separate commercial access from sovereignty: negotiate transparent port, transit and customs arrangements, with guarantees against coercion and unilateral military action.

Renewed fighting in Tigray and rising Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions make diplomacy urgent. The International Crisis Group has warned that the two states are moving closer to direct conflict. Reports of cross-border deployments and support to armed groups require careful attribution, since not every allegation has been independently established. Uncertainty is a reason for direct military communication, third-party engagement and restraint, not rhetoric that narrows the space for negotiation.

Somalia is exposed to the consequences. Ethiopia maintains forces in Somalia under AUSSOM and bilateral arrangements. Bloomberg reported on 30 September that Ethiopia planned to withdraw more than 3,000 troops as fighting intensified at home. Somali officials said they had received no formal notification, and the reporting did not establish whether AUSSOM or bilateral forces would be affected. This is a reported plan, not a confirmed withdrawal. Mogadishu, Addis Ababa and the African Union should clarify the position before local commanders and communities plan around uncertainty.

The timing is serious. Security Council Resolution 2809, adopted on 23 December 2025, extended AUSSOM’s authorisation through 31 December 2026. The United States has told the African Union it intends to discontinue support for the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) beyond the current authorisation period, while allowing a 12-month drawdown of logistical support. UNSOS provides food, fuel, medical support and transport on which the mission depends. AUSSOM’s presence therefore cannot be assessed by headcount alone. Bases without resupply, medical evacuation, transport and maintenance offer a thinner security presence than their nominal numbers suggest.

Resolution 2719, adopted in 2023, established a framework for possible use of UN assessed contributions to support AU-led peace operations on a case-by-case basis. It does not automatically guarantee AUSSOM a fixed allocation. The Security Council, African Union and troop-contributing countries need a realistic transition plan: the costs and duration of continued support, the responsibilities to be transferred to Somali forces, and the conditions under which transfers are safe. A pledging conference might help, but pledges must become timely payments and operational deliveries.

The situation in Hiiraan shows why territorial maps alone are insufficient. The European Union Agency for Asylum’s June 2026 assessment documented Al-Shabaab’s gains in Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle, including influence beyond areas where the group maintains permanent garrisons. The group uses supply routes, taxation, intimidation and parallel dispute resolution to exercise influence. This is spatial reach: the ability to restrict movement, extract resources and shape local decisions without holding every town.

The reported 3 October meeting in Mahaas requires careful description. Al-Shabaab announced an agreement with people identified as Hawadle elders and former Macawiisley fighters, but the signatories’ names and authority were not established in initial reporting, and the wider clan leadership and Somali authorities had not confirmed the terms. The EUAA had already reported Al-Shabaab control of Mahaas by 31 March 2026. The meeting was not a verified surrender by the Hawadle clan or the moment Al-Shabaab first gained the town. It signals contested local authority, exhausted community defence structures and an environment in which armed groups seek accommodation.

Somalia’s federal disputes compound these pressures. Renewed fighting near Baidoa, reported on 26 October, shows how federal-regional conflict diverts attention from the campaign against Al-Shabaab. Mogadishu and Federal Member States need an agreed framework for command coordination, elections and local security responsibilities. Clan communities must not be treated as security instruments, and unverified allegations of collaboration must not become grounds for collective punishment.

Four steps follow. First, Ethiopia and Eritrea should establish direct military communication, supported by the AU and IGAD, and negotiate commercial transit arrangements without prejudice to sovereignty. Second, Ethiopia should clarify any Somali deployment changes, while the AU and federal government assess district-level consequences. Third, the Security Council, AU and bilateral partners should agree a funded UNSOS transition plan before the end of 2026, covering medical evacuation, fuel, aviation, maintenance and transport. Fourth, Mogadishu and Federal Member States should restore dialogue and agree local security arrangements with transparent command, accountability and civilian-protection safeguards.

Early-warning systems should track more than attacks and territory captured. They should monitor garrison rotations, road access, supply interruptions, medical evacuation capacity, local taxation and intimidation, disputes between federal and regional forces, and the ability of communities to sustain lawful self-defence. These indicators offer a more accurate picture of change between towns and along the routes connecting them.

The Horn does not need rigid alignments that turn every port, border or peace-support mission into a test of regional loyalty. It needs a practical compact: commercial access without territorial coercion, regional consultation without proxy escalation, and a Somali transition supported by resources that match its mandate. The crisis in the north will not determine Somalia’s future on its own. But unmanaged rivalry, combined with a fragile security transition and domestic political fragmentation, would give Al-Shabaab opportunities to widen its influence. Preventing those openings is a shared responsibility. Coordinated action is needed before the next withdrawal, funding gap or political confrontation, not after its consequences are visible.

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