Strategies for the Horn: UNGA at 80 and the Future

As the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) concludes, its resolutions and diplomatic undertakings present both opportunities and risks for the Horn of Africa. For a region wracked by overlapping crises including drought, conflict, fractured state institutions, and fluctuating donor commitments, the global conversations in New York matter less as rhetoric and more as levers for real change. The question facing decision makers in the Horn is this: can the outcomes of UNGA be translated into durable gains on the ground, or will they be swallowed by structural instabilities and shifting geopolitics?

One of the more concrete outputs from UNGA this year was the reaffirmation of Resolution 79/264, which emphasizes durable peace through sustainable development in Africa.[1] That resolution invites a more holistic approach to conflict, not as a matter of ceasefires alone, but as contests over resource access, infrastructure, climate resilience, and social inclusion. For the Horn of Africa states, which are often locked in security-first mindsets, this language opens a diplomatic space for development-security linkages. Moreover, UNGA 80 saw renewed emphasis on reforming international financial architecture, debt relief, and sustainable financing for Africa, and Africa’s delegations pushed for a sharper, more unified continental posture.[2]

This chance comes at a very uncertain time. The Horn of Africa is under heavy strain from climate disasters and humanitarian crises. The region’s worst drought in decades, hitting Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, and others has forced millions to leave their homes, killed livestock, and weakened food supplies.[3] In 2025, more than 307 million Africans are facing hunger, with East Africa being one of the hardest-hit regions.[4] The mix of climate problems and conflict means that even a well-meaning UNGA resolution can be overwhelmed by real-life challenges.

Another big problem is the withdrawal of donor funding. New reports show that official development aid dropped in 2024: general development support fell by 7.1 percent and humanitarian aid by almost 9.6 percent.[5] At the same time, the U.S. has cut back USAID funding for countries it calls “non-strategic partners,” putting extra pressure on health systems in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and others.[6] An additional shock came from the U.S. decision to freeze transfers to the WHO, which could cut its budget by 20 percent and weaken its ability to support health programs in Africa.[7] This means Horn of Africa countries face more demand for help but with fewer outside resources to respond. These gaps in funding put services, state credibility, and social stability at risk.

In this situation, UNGA’s diplomatic outcomes offer some chances, to African leaders. First, the renewed calls to reform global institutions give the Horn of Africa countries a chance to push for rules that better fit fragile settings. On debt, humanitarian aid, or climate finance, African delegations can use this momentum to demand fairer, more flexible systems. That means pushing to make sure promises made in New York turn into actual money delivered, not just delayed commitments. Second, stronger regional voices at UNGA, like IGAD raising Horn of Africa issues and the creation of a new regional UN office, show a chance to reshape regional diplomacy. IGAD’s bigger role at UNGA is meant to improve coordination with global partners on peace, climate, health, and humanitarian response.[8] This could help avoid duplication, put Horn priorities at the center of aid programs, and strengthen local leadership instead of outside control. Third, there is growing need for local resource mobilization and African-based philanthropy, especially as donors pull back worldwide. Experts warn that when donors leave, organizations lose stability, trust, and momentum.[9] Horn countries must treat local resource mobilization not as a temporary fix but as a long-term solution: building fair tax systems, tapping diaspora support, encouraging local giving, and building stronger partnerships between business and civil society.

On the other hand, these chances also come with serious risks. If governments in the Horn of Africa countries use UNGA declarations only as cover without real reform, they risk losing the trust from their citizens and from international donors. Even worse, big power rivalries could hijack regional goals. We should also take note that the Horn of Africa  is also a zone of growing competition: Gulf states, China, Turkey, Egypt, and others are all expanding their influence through military deals or infrastructure projects.[10] As presented in the our briefing paper, the Horn countries should work together, either through regional institutions, or agreed upon models to avoid these external powers exploiting their division. Another danger is relying too much on external promises made at UNGA side events. For example, in 2023 donors pledged US$2.4 billion for the Horn, but that was less than what was needed and still left many gaps.[11] There are other pledges made this year and we wait to see the outcomes from these engagements. Depending too heavily on such big pledges, without local support and clear checks leads to repeated shortages and broken promises. The Horn of Africa countries must break this cycle of “promises made, promises delayed, crisis continues.” Finally, regional unity cannot ignore domestic problems. In Ethiopia, ongoing conflict in Tigray and disputes over federal governance weaken its ability to lead in the region.[12] Kenya is pushing for regional leadership but faces tensions with neighbors and the heavy cost of peacekeeping and mediation. Overall, without stable, reliable anchor states, institutions like IGAD risk becoming more divided instead of united.

Given these challenges, here is what Scofield Associates suggests:

• First, we recommend that the Horn of Africa governments and regional bodies turn UNGA decisions into real agreements with clear goals, timelines, and accountability frameworks. These agreements should connect peace, development, and climate protection. For example, the Horn of Africa Compact could link conflict-sensitive projects (like cross-border water systems) to local peace benefits and climate funding.[13]
• Second, the Horn should bring together support from African philanthropists, the diaspora, and private businesses into joint investment funds focused on resilience and social services. UNGA promises alone cannot keep health systems or climate programs going; the region needs pooled local resources. Scofield suggests creating a Horn of Africa Resilience Fund, supported by member states, diaspora bonds, and big investors, with priority given to early warning systems, safety nets for the poor, and climate-smart farming.
• Third, civil society and local actors must be placed at the center of these efforts. With donors pulling back, governments must prove their legitimacy through results, especially at the local level. This means setting up public participation channels, transparent systems for UNGA-related funds, and regular reviews by independent groups. Scofield would work with partners to build feedback loops so that global promises lead to local results.
• Finally, strong diplomacy and clear messaging are key. The Horn delegations at UNGA and other development forums should speak with one united voice, focused on climate justice, fair debt treatment, regional cooperation, and human dignity rather than pushing divided national agendas. A united voice can turn UNGA’s influence into lasting commitments from global actors.

To policymakers, African philanthropists, and development partners: the UNGA moment is not just ceremony. For the Horn of Africa, it is a turning point: either the region uses global diplomacy to drive long-term change, or it remains stuck reacting to crises and divisions. Moving forward requires an acceptance that nothing is guaranteed, and determination to turn promises into strong institutions, local funding, and resilient systems. Scofield Associates believes the Horn should not wait for agreement in New York: its leaders must take charge of shaping and owning a new regional framework now.

References: 

[1] United Nations General Assembly. (2025, January 15). Promotion of durable peace through sustainable development in Africa: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/RES/79/264). United Nations. https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/79/264

[2] UNGA 80: Africa’s priorities on the global stage. (2025, September 8). ORF Online. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/unga-80-africa-s-priorities-on-the-global-stage

[3] Food and Agriculture Organization. (2023, April 27). Horn of Africa: The region is facing an unprecedented disaster. FAO. https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/horn-of-africa—the-region-is-facing-an-unprecedented-disaster/en

[4] In 2025, more than 307 million Africans are facing hunger, with East Africa being one of the hardest-hit regions. https://igad.int/agriculture-environment/agriculture-and-food-security/food-security-and-agriculture-production/

[5] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2025, April 16). International aid falls in 2024 for first time in six years, says OECD. OECD. https://www.oecd.org/en/about/news/press-releases/2025/04/official-development-assistance-2024-figures.html#:~:text=International%20aid%20from%20official%20donors,data%20collected%20by%20the%20OECD.

[6] Kenyan News Agency. (2025). Retrenchments loom as USAID cuts health funding in Kenya. Kenyan News Agency. https://www.kenyanews.go.ke/retrenchments-loom-as-usaid-cuts-health-funding-in-kenya/

[7] World Health Organization. (2025, March 30). WHO must cut budget by fifth after U.S. pullout https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250329-who-must-cut-budget-by-fifth-after-us-pullout-email.

[8] IGAD. (2025). IGAD advances regional priorities and global partnerships at UNGA80.https://igad.int/igad-advances-regional-priorities-and-global-partnerships-at-unga80/

[9] Global Fund for Community Foundations. (2025). When the well runs dry: Rethinking development in the wake of donor withdrawal. https://globalfundcommunityfoundations.org/blog/when-the-well-runs-dry/

[10] Dizolele, M. P., Singo, M., & Wondimu, H. (2025, February 24). Vying for Regional Leadership in the Horn of Africa. Center for Strategic and International Studies.https://www.csis.org/analysis/vying-regional-leadership-horn-africa

[11] Mercy Corps. (2023, May 24). Horn of Africa pledging falls short, puts millions of lives further at risk. Mercy Corps.https://www.mercycorps.org/press-room/releases/horn-of-africa-pledging-falls-short#:~:text=forced%20to%20flee.-,Horn%20of%20Africa%20Pledging%20Falls%20Short%2C%20Puts,of%20Lives%20Further%20at%20Risk&text=Following%20today’s%20High%2Dlevel%20Pledging,of%20a%20major%20funding%20shortfall.

[12] Dizolele, M. P., Singo, M., & Wondimu, H. (2025, February 24). Vying for Regional Leadership in the Horn of Africa. Center for Strategic and International Studies.https://www.csis.org/analysis/vying-regional-leadership-horn-africa

[13] UNEP-DHI Partnership – Centre on Water and Environment. Cross-border water management for peace and resilience in the Horn of Africa. https://unepdhi.org/horn-of-africa-cross-border-water-management/