“The situation in Haiti can and must be solved.” - Transforming the Haiti Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) into Effective Action

Introduction

At a recent high-level meeting at the United Nations, President William Ruto of Kenya emphasized the urgent need for decisive international engagement in Haiti. He framed Kenya’s leadership of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission as both a responsibility and a demonstration of African states’ proactive role in addressing global peace and security issues. His call was echoed by the submissions of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, who underscored the importance of international support to stabilize Haiti while stressing the financial, logistical, and political commitments required for the mission to succeed. Together, these statements highlight the convergence of African leadership and Western partnership but also expose the weight of expectations placed on a mission that is still facing significant operational and political hurdles.

This brief builds on these interventions to examine how the MSS mission in Haiti has performed to date, what gaps remain, and what can be done to ensure that its goals are met. It is directed at ambassadors, ministers, policymakers, and practitioners preparing for Security Council deliberations, as well as Haitian civil society actors and international observers. By focusing on practical realities, this analysis aims to provide a clear account of where the mission stands, what has worked, and what has not, while offering insights into realistic pathways that reflect both the political rhetoric at the UN and the ground realities in Haiti.

This brief will inform critical decision-making processes at the Security Council and in the capitals of troop-contributing and donor states. It should guide the shaping of negotiating positions, drafting of resolutions, and allocation of resources for the mission. Beyond that, it provides Haitian civil society and international organizations with a factual basis to demand accountability and transparency from all actors involved, ensuring that the mission’s legitimacy is anchored not only in UN mandates but also in the lived experiences of Haitian communities who are meant to benefit from its operations.

The objectives are threefold. First, to present a summarized account of what the MSS mission has achieved and where it falls short of its goals. Second, it analyzes recent statements by President Ruto and Deputy Secretary Landau to highlight the alignment and divergence of priorities between African leadership and Western partners. Third, to offer actionable recommendations to strengthen MSS operations, improve governance and transparency, and ensure that expectations are realistically aligned with available resources and Haiti’s internal dynamics.

Achievements So Far

In October 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission in Haiti through Resolution 2699 (2023). The MSS mission was led by Kenya to restore security in Haiti, counter gang violence, support humanitarian access, and help Haitian institutions prepare for political transition (including elections). The MSS was to deploy approximately 2,500 personnel under a UN resolution. Kenya committed to providing leadership, logistics, and a substantial police presence. Early diplomatic steps included agreements between Kenya and Haiti (reciprocal legal agreements) to allow for deployment. Some police and security units were deployed, mainly from Kenya, with limited support from other countries. Some logistic support has been made available, notably transportation and vehicles. International attention has increased; the humanitarian situation in Haiti (displacement, food insecurity, and gang control of large areas of Port-au-Prince) remains severe, highlighting the urgency.

Challenges Witnessed

 First, the force strength is substantially below plan: MSS is operating at approximately 40% of its planned 2,500 personnel. This reduces the capacity to secure territory, respond to gang activity, and cover the most affected zones. Second, logistics and transportation are weak in the region. The reliance on second-hand U.S. vehicles has resulted in frequent breakdowns. In many cases, vehicles fail in insecure zones, exposing deployed personnel to danger. Third, resource gaps extend beyond vehicles; supply chains, maintenance, medical support, and communication infrastructure are not yet reliable. Fourth, governance and institutional weaknesses in Haiti remain severe. Local police are undertrained, under-equipped, and understaffed; Haitian judicial institutions are weak, and political instability reduces continuity. Fifth, the mandate’s expiry and clarity remain unresolved. Stakeholders say MSS’s mandate ends soon; the nature of the transition to the GSF or peacekeeping is not yet formalized, and timelines are uncertain. Sixth, the expectations versus reality gap. The international community (including the U.S.) calls for rapid security gains, but local victims, displaced persons, and civil society often see little improvement day-to-day.

The mission’s underperformance in terms of force size and logistics suggests that unless resource inputs increase sharply, the MSS will struggle to meet the UN mandate’s security and humanitarian goals. President Ruto’s warnings about logistics are not mere complaints; they point to systemic weaknesses that risk failing the mission. The U.S.’s push for a larger GSF indicates that the MSS in its current form may be judged insufficient. Thus, there is an increasing international consensus that MSS needs transformation, either in mandate, resources, structure, or all three. However, this must be balanced with risks: if the mission becomes too large without adequate oversight, abuse and loss of legitimacy may ensue. Haitian authorities and civil society also expect greater transparency, accountability, and local ownership. The impending mandate expiry makes it critical that agreements are made soon on what comes next. Stakeholders must engage now to define whether the MSS is renewed, converted, or replaced.

Alignments and Divergences

The Kenyan president at the UN High-Level Meeting affirms a strong commitment: he said, “the situation in Haiti can and must be solved,” while also warning that unpredictable logistics, transport deficits, and resource shortages threaten mission success. While thanking the U.S. for providing transport, he notes that many vehicles were second-hand, unreliable, and risky for personnel when they broke down in dangerous areas, putting the force in harm’s way. He also lamented the lack of useful support from other quarters. On the other hand, the U.S., via Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, pushed for the expansion of the mission into a larger Gang Suppression Force (GSF), with a broader mandate and more resources. The U.S. also called for stronger sanctions against former Haitian officials implicated in corruption or other wrongdoing.

The statement by Kenyan President William Ruto at the UN High-Level Meeting affirms a clear commitment to Haiti, framing it as a solvable crisis that demands international cooperation. His remark that “the situation in Haiti can and must be solved” underscores Kenya’s determination to provide leadership and legitimacy to the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission. Yet his tone is also cautionary, highlighting practical obstacles that are undermining operational effectiveness. President Ruto points out that unpredictable logistics, persistent transport deficits, and inadequate resources threaten the safety of deployed personnel. His critique exposed a tension between political promises of support and the actual quality and timeliness of assistance provided. By lamenting the absence of meaningful backing from other quarters, Ruto also reveals the difficulty of mobilizing broad-based international solidarity beyond U.S. support, raising questions about burden-sharing and the sustainability of African-led interventions without consistent global investment.

In contrast, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau frames Washington’s priority as expanding the MSS into a more robust Gang Suppression Force (GSF). This proposed evolution reflects U.S. concerns that the current MSS mandate, which focuses narrowly on stabilizing key infrastructure and supporting Haitian police, may not be sufficient to dismantle entrenched armed groups. Landau stresses the need for more resources and personnel to confront the scale of insecurity, signaling that the U.S. favors a stronger military-style intervention rather than a limited stabilization mission. He also emphasizes political accountability, calling for stronger sanctions against former Haitian officials implicated in corruption and criminality, a measure that resonates with U.S. foreign policy traditions but was absent from Ruto’s speech.

The alignment between Kenyan and U.S. positions lies in their shared acknowledgment that Haiti’s crisis is urgent and solvable if international actors remain engaged. Both leaders signal readiness to sustain operations beyond the current mandate, recognizing the mission’s October 2025 expiry date as a critical juncture. Yet their divergence lies in emphasis and framing. Ruto foregrounded logistical and material gaps, situating Kenya’s role as dependent on adequate resourcing and reliable equipment, while also implicitly cautioning against overpromising in an environment where African troops are bearing operational risks. Landau, on the other hand, stresses mission expansion, governance reforms, and sanctions, aligning with Washington’s strategic interest in curbing criminal networks and restoring state authority. These differences reflect not only distinct national perspectives but also structural asymmetries between African troop-contributing states that provide manpower and Western partners that dominate funding and strategic direction.

This contrast will shape the deliberations ahead. If the UN Security Council renews or transforms the MSS mandate into a larger GSF or a UN peacekeeping mission, balancing these perspectives will be essential. Kenya’s insistence on logistical reliability, fair resource allocation, and operational safety must be reconciled with Washington’s push for a broader mandate and political conditionality. Without this alignment, the risk is that the mission will face both under-resourcing and mission creep, undermining its legitimacy and effectiveness. For African leadership to remain credible in global security governance, Ruto’s caution about practical support cannot be dismissed, while U.S. calls for expanded objectives highlight the international community’s expectation that Haiti’s crisis requires not only security responses but also structural political change. This tension between operational pragmatism and strategic ambition defines the current debate, and how it is resolved will determine whether the mission evolves into a sustainable model or another short-lived intervention.

Recommendations

 Given the problems, what has been done, and what remains, the following steps are urgent and realistic and should feature in forthcoming Security Council resolutions or diplomatic agreements.

1. Secure reliable logistics and equipment: Donor states must prioritize the safety of deployed forces. This means providing new or certified vehicles with maintenance support, medical evacuation capacity, communications systems, and spare parts. Secondhand, unreliable equipment should not be used in gang-controlled areas where breakdowns put personnel at direct risk.
2. Complete full deployment: The MSS has not yet reached its pledged strength of 2,500. Troop- and police-contributing countries must finalize commitments and deploy personnel within 30–60 days. Delays undermine operational credibility, overstretch current contingents, and erode local trust in the mission.
3. Adopt a dual-track approach: The Security Council should combine immediate operational safety measures with authorization for a gradual mandate expansion into a Gang Suppression Force. This balances Kenyan concerns over resources and troop safety with U.S. priorities for more robust action against organized armed groups.
4. Establish joint accountability: A co-chaired oversight mechanism, involving African troop contributors and major donors, should monitor resource flows, operational support, and political reforms in Haiti. This creates shared ownership, limits asymmetries in decision-making, and ensures that both operational and governance objectives are met.
5. Set measurable benchmarks: The mission needs clear, public indicators of success. These include the number of secured zones, reductions in gang attacks, displacement figures, civilian casualties, and frequency of joint operations with Haitian police. Benchmarks should be tied to 30, 90, and 180-day timelines to allow the Council to track progress and adjust strategy.
6. Clarify the mission’s future: With the MSS mandate expiring in October 2025, the Council must decide if it evolves into a GSF, a formal UN peacekeeping force, or another model. This decision must include cost estimates, command structures, rules of engagement, and oversight arrangements to prevent uncertainty and mission drift.
7. Strengthen oversight and rights protections: An independent monitoring body with civil society participation should be established to track human rights compliance, publish regular external reports, and provide complaint mechanisms accessible to Haitian civilians. This protects mission legitimacy and prevents abuses.
8. Build Haitian capacity: International support must strengthen the Haitian National Police, judicial institutions, and public administration alongside MSS operations. Training, predictable funding, and local leadership development are key to ensuring Haiti can sustain security gains without indefinite external support.
9. Balance security with humanitarian needs: Donor support must include funding for food, water, health, and justice systems. Without visible improvements in daily life, security operations alone will not earn community trust or produce long-term stability.
10. Plan for exit and handover: The mission must define clear conditions for transitioning authority to Haitian institutions. These should be linked to benchmarks on security, institutional capacity, and governance, ensuring an orderly handover rather than a premature or open-ended international presence.
11. Engage civil society: Haitian civil society organizations and community leaders should be included in planning, monitoring, and evaluation. Their involvement improves situational awareness, strengthens legitimacy, and ensures that operations respond to local needs and realities.
12. Align international expectations: Policymakers, ambassadors, and ministers must recognize that stabilizing Haiti will be incremental and uneven. Success should be measured by sustained improvements in security and governance, not by unrealistic timelines. This requires patience, consistent funding, and transparent progress reporting to manage expectations.

The international community expects swift improvements in safety for Haitian civilians, access for humanitarian agencies, and progress toward elections. However, the realities are harsher: insecurity remains deep, institutions are weak, displacement is massive, and political authority is contested. Any resolution at the Security Council should reflect this: renew mandates with caution, condition expansions on performance, match resources to the scope of the mission, and insist on oversight. Countries contributing troops must be supported materially and legally. Donors must commit to the long term. Overall, Haiti’s voice must not be ignored!